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Abstract 
The trade-off between security and liberty has been a leading frame for understanding public opinion about domestic surveillance 
policies. Most of the empirical work explicitly examining whether individuals meet the trade-off framework’s core attitudinal 
assumptions comes from European studies. This study uses a survey of US residents to assess the veracity of the assumptions 
embedded in the trade-off framework, namely whether domestic counterterrorism policies are simultaneously viewed as improving 
security and decreasing liberty. We find that the vast majority of US respondents do not meet the basic attitudinal assumptions of 
the trade-off frame. Next, we evaluate the source of these attitudes with a focus on whether attitudes toward surveillance policies 
merely relate to core political values or whether they also depend on the messages from political leaders. We find that both political 
values and opinion leadership shape these attitudes. Finally, because general attitudes towards surveillance and privacy often fail to 
have practical implications, we assess whether these attitudes matter for understanding the structure of policy support. Our results 
show that heightened terrorism threat positively associates with increased support for counterterrorism policies only when people 
believe these policies are effective security tools. 
 
Introduction 
A large and informative literature examines US public opinion surrounding counterterrorism policy and the 
curtailing of individual privacy. Much of this US scholarship, however, relies on the assumption that 
counterterrorism policy preferences are shaped by a security-liberty trade-off, with individuals choosing 
their preferred policy by advantaging one value (i.e., security) at the expense of the other (i.e., liberty) (e.g., 
Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2005; Lewis 2005; Strickland and Hunt 2005; Stevens and Vaughn-
Williams 2014; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Garcia and Geva 2016). This common practice of using the 
trade-off perspective has been criticized as normatively problematic because it advantages security over 
liberty (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2012; Solove 2008; van den Broek et al. 2017), assuming without factual 
basis that security and privacy cannot be simultaneously achieved when in fact these may be “compatible 
rather than antagonistic” (Degli Espositi, Payone, and Santiago-Gomez 2017: 72). Assuming, as the trade-
off frame does, an all or nothing interconnection of security and privacy minimizes the importance of 
privacy, relegating it to a secondary societal value with security typically placed above privacy on the 
hierarchy of societal needs (Fuchs 2013; Solove 2008; Cas et al. 2017; Strauβ 2017). The importance of 
privacy for free expression, political engagement, and healthy democratic institutions is sidelined or absent 
from most trade-off discussions (Solove 2008). Due to the trade-off framework’s inherent partiality towards 
security and its prevalence in structuring public opinion research, empirical scholars should assess whether 
individuals actually conform to core assumptions of the security-liberty trade-off.  
Indeed, this systematic assessment of public opinion and the supposed trade-off has been undertaken in 
certain contexts. Several large and multifaceted European studies have sought to test whether the trade-off 
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framework empirically organizes European residents’ attitudes about domestic security policies (van den 
Broek et al. 2017; Potoglou et al. 2010; Friedwald and Bellanova 2015). Broadly speaking, these studies 
cast serious doubt on the trade-off framework, suggesting that ordinary people do not view privacy 
enhancing domestic security policies as necessarily leading to decreases in security (e.g., van den Broek et 
al. 2017). Despite examination of the trade-off framework in Europe, whether or not attitudes conform to 
this framework has not yet been deeply examined in the United States. Henderson (2015) notes that this 
trade-off may be culturally contextual with attitudes conforming to differentiated patterns across 
environments (see also Budak et al. 2017). Similarly, Menichelli (2017: 102) observes, “It is no longer 
possible to ignore questions of cultural, societal, and geographic variation when we talk about security and 
privacy.” Certainly, given the pervasiveness of the use of this framework throughout the American public 
opinion literature, it is useful to directly study this question in a US context. 
We begin our study of US residents by assessing the veracity of the assumptions embedded in the trade-off 
framework. Specifically, we examine if various counterterrorism policies are simultaneously viewed as 
improving security but also decreasing liberty. We find that the vast majority of respondents do not conform 
to these core assumptions of the trade-off framework. Rather than a trade-off, most simply think these 
surveillance policies either have no effect on reducing terrorism or have no negative privacy implications 
for ordinary individuals. 
Next, we offer an explanation for how attitudes about the security effectiveness and privacy implications of 
these surveillance policies are structured. Consistent with standard approaches to understanding the 
structure of public opinion, we find that US residents exhibit security and privacy attitudes about domestic 
counterterrorism policies consistent with their political predispositions and existing knowledge. This 
suggests that these attitudes are not merely based on political leanings or values but instead are importantly 
shaped by elite messaging.  
Finally, we assess the empirical implications of the lack of a security-liberty trade-off. This is important to 
consider because the privacy opinion literature has often recognized what is known as a “privacy paradox,” 
where individuals’ general surveillance and privacy opinions do not translate into obvious or expected 
outcomes such as positive correlations with engagement in privacy protecting behaviors or opposition to 
concrete public policies that violate privacy (Azjen 1991; Barth and deJong 2017). For this project, we 
consider how the lack of trade-off attitudes may impact the well-known relationship between perceived 
terrorism threat and support for counterterrorism policies. We show that terrorism threat positively predicts 
support for domestic counterterrorism policies only for those that believe these policies work as intended in 
reducing terrorism. These results suggest that opinions about the components of the privacy-security trade-
off matter. 
The Security-Liberty Trade-Off Framework and US Public Opinion 
This notion that one desirable policy goal or value comes at the expense of another value is nothing new. 
From lower taxes and government spending to environmental protection and economic growth to 
unemployment and inflation, the pursuit of one desired outcome is often associated with the loss of a second 
outcome (Hibbs 1979; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Citrin 1979). Consistent with this approach, in the 
contemporary US literature, the trade-off between security and liberty has been the leading frame for 
scholarly discourse surrounding surveillance policies designed to reduce terrorism. Dragu (2011: 64) finds 
that this trade-off frame is ubiquitous, “almost everyone—citizens, policy makers, political pundits, and 
scholars—approaches the formulation of counterterrorism policies as a balancing act between allegedly 
competing values of privacy and security” (see also Lewis 2005; Strickland and Hunt 2005; Stevens and 
Vaughn-Williams 2014; Garcia and Geva 2016). The most highly cited US opinion literature on domestic 
Krueger, Best, and Johnson: Assessing Dimensions 
Surveillance & Society 18(1) 106 
counterterrorism policies certainly uses a trade-off frame (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2005), often 
structuring research designs to force respondents into using the trade-off approach.1  
Two typically unarticulated assumptions about public opinion are central to these trade-off arguments: (1) 
these domestic counterterrorism policies are seen as effective at reducing terrorism and (2) respondents 
believe these policies damage civil liberties (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2012). That these surveillance 
policies work and that these policies violate citizens’ privacy are taken as givens throughout much of the 
US public opinion literature. Yet security specialists have long noted that while the trade-off model of 
placing security and privacy at “opposite ends of a single continuum has appealing properties, it is overly 
simplistic” because domestic counterterrorism policy “implementation is not always effective” at reducing 
terrorism and only some domestic surveillance policies “degrade privacy” (Conti, Shay, and Hartzog 2014: 
28–29; Degli Espositi, Payone, and Santiago-Gomez 2017.). Additionally, even if some domestic 
surveillance policies lead to a security-privacy trade-off, ordinary individuals may not appreciate all sides 
of the risks and benefits associated with a particular policy, thus their thinking about these issues may not 
conform to the trade-off frame (Margolis 1996; Sunstein 2003; Gaskell et al. 2004; Degli Espositi, Payone, 
and Santiago-Gomez 2017).  
Although the security-liberty trade-off frame has produced valuable public opinion research about domestic 
surveillance programs, no studies have deeply examined whether US residents meet the basic conditions for 
using this trade-off framework when formulating opinions about these policies (though see the 
aforementioned European PRISMS project for a complementary approach).2 If US residents use the trade-
off frame to structure their opinions then we should find widespread evidence supporting the assumptions 
of the trade-off approach. Particularly, we should find that individuals generally perceive these policies to 
be both effective at reducing terrorism as well as a violation of privacy. Without each of these assumptions 
met, individuals could not view the decision to support or oppose these policies as a trade-off, and it would 
call into question the dominance of this trade-off framework for understanding attitudes towards domestic 
surveillance policies in the US.3 
                                                   
1 Davis and Silver’s Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America 
is among the best-known public opinion pieces in this genre. The use of “vs.” in the title places security and civil 
liberties in direct interconnected opposition. The main battery of Davis and Silver’s (2004: 44) questions make these 
trade-offs explicit by asking respondents to tell surveyors which statement they agree with the most: “in order to curb 
terrorism in this country, it will be necessary to give up some civil liberties, -or- we should preserve our freedoms 
above all, even if there remains some risk of terrorism.” Respondents are put into one or the other trade-off camp. 
Because of the forced choice nature of the question, unless they refused to answer the question, respondents could 
hardly escape the trade-off frame. In their equally influential early treatment of civil liberties and security after 9/11, 
Huddy et al. (2005: 603) take a similar trade-off approach to organize public opinion, finding that “[t]he public was 
split on this trade-off” between concern that antiterrorism laws would not be strong enough to prevent terrorism and 
worry about how strong counterterrorism laws would lead to a loss of civil liberties. 
2 A European project, Privacy and Security Mirrors (PRISMS) used both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
consider many dimensions of privacy and security, including the appropriateness of using the trade-off framework 
for understanding citizen attitudes. Although attitudes towards government policies, technology, privacy, and security 
vary widely throughout the European countries studied, the general conclusion is that the trade-off frame does not 
explain how most Europeans structure their attitudes (Friedewald et al. 2016; Friedewald et al. 2015; Pavone and 
Degli Esposti 2012). 
3 A US context complements the rich European studies as these studies suggest that support for surveillance and the 
trade-off argument may rely on cultural variance (Henderson 2015; Budak et al. 2017), are tied to type and goal of 
surveillance activities (Degli Espositi, Payone, and Santiago-Gomez 2017), and are policy specific (van den Broek et 
al. 2017). The US, in contrast to European country samples, has an enduring two-party system. The US system 
uniquely offers the opportunity to constrain dialogue surrounding competing values of security and privacy due to 
the limited nature of argument within political space. Multi-party systems may require more nuance in identification 
of specific policies and actions associated with security and/or privacy resulting in a more nuanced and engaged 
examination of the concepts in political space. 
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Fortunately, a unique 2007 probability sample survey (Best 2007) conducted by the authors4 asks US 
residents questions about several domestic counterterrorism policies ranging from the US government 
reading emails and listening to phone calls without a warrant to the government accessing phone metadata 
to the mandated carrying of a national ID card to full body x-rays at airports. Importantly, rather than 
assuming that respondents view these policies in terms of a trade-off, these questions separately assess the 
assumptions of the trade-off frame. With separate stand-alone questions, the survey assesses whether 
respondents (1) think each of these policies violate ordinary individuals’ privacy and (2) think these policies 
will be effective at reducing terrorism. The question wording is detailed below: 
Read Email Messages 
Do you think reading ordinary Americans’ email messages will or will not be effective 
in reducing the threat of terrorism? 
Do you think reading ordinary Americans’ email messages does or does not violate the 
personal privacy of people like you? 
Collect Telephone Metadata 
Do you think looking at the telephone numbers dialed by ordinary Americans without 
listening to the content of their calls will or will not be effective in reducing the threat 
of terrorism? 
Do you think looking at the telephone numbers dialed by ordinary Americans without 
listening to the content of their calls does or does not violate the personal privacy of 
people like you? 
Wiretap Phone Conversations 
Do you think wiretapping telephone conversations between ordinary Americans will or 
will not be effective in reducing the threat of terrorism? 
Do you think wiretapping telephone conversations between ordinary Americans does or 
does not violate the personal privacy of people like you? 
Carry National ID Cards  
                                                   
4 As part of a larger project designed to investigate political attitudes and behaviors during the summer of 2007, the 
Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut administered an RDD telephone sample of 
adult, non-institutionalized residents of the contiguous United States. From August 15 through September 12, 2007, 
telephone numbers were dialed daily. Interviewers attempted up to eight calls to contact potential respondents and 
used a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system to administer questions and record responses. The 
response rate was 36.2%, which yielded 1036 respondents. Although not as high as some national surveys, such as 
the National Election Studies or the General Social Surveys, research has shown that this response rate was common 
for this time period and does not necessary yield lower quality data (Keeter et al. 2000). All analyses were run using 
weighted data (by race, gender, age, and education). Because of their centrality to the analysis, and the fact that table 
1 displays frequencies, we do not impute any of the missing data for the questions used as dependent variables. But 
when independent variables had missing values, we did impute. In our view, the loss of information by fully 
discarding any case that had even one missing value across all independent variables would have been worse than 
imputation. We took a simple approach to avoid leveraging the results: we assigned missing values to either the 
neutral positon or the median value. 
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Do you think requiring ordinary Americans to carry a national identification card at all 
times will or will not be effective in reducing the threat of terrorism? 
Do you think requiring ordinary Americans to carry a national identification card at all 
times does or does not violate the personal privacy of people like you? 
 X-Ray Machine before Boarding Flight 
Do you think requiring airline passengers to walk through and be scanned by x-ray 
machines before being able to board a flight will or will not be effective in reducing the 
threat of terrorism? 
Do you think requiring airline passengers to walk through and be scanned by x-ray 
machines before being able to board a flight does or does not violate the personal 
privacy of people like you? (Best 2007) 
Table 1 displays the cross-tabulations of the above “effective” and “violate” questions for each of the five 
domestic counterterrorism policies. Respondents can fall into four categories for each policy. They may 
think these policies are (1) not effective and not a violation of privacy, (2) not effective and a violation of 
privacy, (3) effective and not a violation of privacy, or (4) effective and a violation of privacy. Any of the 
first three categories do not satisfy the assumptions of a trade-off between security and liberty. Only those 
respondents in the fourth category satisfy the assumptions of the trade-off frame. Individuals in the fourth 
category may wrestle with a security-liberty values trade-off when considering whether to support domestic 
surveillance policies as they view these policies as effective at reducing terrorism but at the same time likely 
to violate privacy. This fourth category conforms well to the classic security-liberty trade-off dilemma, 
which leads to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The security-liberty trade-off framework expects the majority of US residents to view 
these policies as both effective at reducing terrorism and a violation of privacy. 
For each of the five domestic counterterrorism policies, about one quarter or fewer of respondents fall into 
the classic trade-off category. In other words, for any given policy only between six and twenty-six percent 
conform to the trade-off assumption that these policies are both effective at reducing terrorism and a threat 
to ordinary individuals’ privacy. On average, less than one in five respondents would possibly wrestle with 
the security-liberty trade-off when deciding whether to support these domestic policies.  
The first category generally held the lowest proportion of respondents. Only a small fraction, averaging just 
over eleven percent of the sample, believe that these policies are both not effective at reducing terrorism 
and at the same time not a violation of privacy. For this group, the decision to support these domestic 
counterterrorism polices is not a security-liberty trade-off. Indeed, neither of the key outcomes, security or 
privacy, are at stake. 
On average, over a third of respondents fall into the category representing views that these policies do not 
effectively reduce terrorism but do violate privacy. These individuals seem to see these domestic 
surveillance policies as liberty infirming security theatre. Similarly sized proportions fell into the opposite 
category—beliefs that these policies do effectively reduce terrorism but do not violate privacy. These 
individuals believe in the ability of these policies to achieve the stated security objectives without the 
negative privacy externalities. For each of the five policies, the largest group of respondents resides in one 
of these middle categories.  
The cross-tabulations tell a clear story. The vast majority of US residents do not believe that these policies 
are both effective at reducing terrorism and at the same time a violation of privacy. Hypothesis 1, based on 
the security-liberty trade-off framework, is not supported, making it hard to accept that this frame explains 
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how individuals evaluate domestic counterterrorism policies in the US. Indeed, despite its prominence, the 
trade-off frame seems deeply inadequate as an explanation for the attitudes of the vast majority of US 
residents. That 71%, 68%, 71%, 68%, and 79% of respondents reside across the middle two categories in 
Table 1 suggests that perceptions about the security and privacy implications of these policies are generally 
sorted into polar opposite camps. What then explains the dissonance between the core assumptions of the 
trade-off frame and the presented empirical evidence about polarized privacy and efficacy perceptions of 
these domestic counterterrorism policies? We expect that, like many other political attitudes, this opinion 
polarization towards the privacy implications and effectiveness of domestic surveillance programs are likely 
explained by elite opinion leadership models. 
Certainly, the pattern of elite communication was polarized on domestic surveillance policies, with one 
study showing that the major networks evenly split airtime between those who supported and criticized the 
administration’s domestic counterterrorism policies (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011). President 
Bush’s supporters and surrogates claimed that these surveillance practices targeted only potential terrorists 
and extolled the importance of these counterterrorism approaches for protecting the lives of Americans. 
Opponents of the administration argued that these new domestic counterterrorism policies were merely 
ineffective security theatre that did little to protect Americans but that did damage the privacy of ordinary 
citizens (Richey 2009).  
 
Table 1: Effective Reducing Terrorism and Violation of Privacy for Broad-based Domestic Anti-Terrorism Policies 
 
Given the elite patterns of divergence in messages regarding the security efficacy and privacy implications 
of these policies, an elite opinion leadership model may help explain the opinion polarization pattern seen 
in Table 1. Many related approaches to understanding elite opinion leadership exist (for example, 
Vermeesch and De Pauw 2017), but Zaller’s (1992) well-known “Receive-Accept-Sample” (RAS) 
framework is particularly well suited to be tested using survey data such as the type included in this study. 
Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample model suggests that elite messages can influence attitudes but elite 
influence depends on the individual’s political predispositions and political knowledge. Politically 
sophisticated recipients are informed about the political debates occurring between elites and tend to heed 
the arguments about policy from leaders with whom they are predisposed to agree. Additionally, 
knowledgeable individuals are unlikely to be converted by counter-attitudinal elite messages because they 
are better able to neutralize arguments when they come from elites with whom they are predisposed to 
disagree. Message recipients with higher levels of knowledge are less likely to be swayed by a counter-
attitudinal message because they have the tools to question the credibility of the messenger and evidence. 
 Tradeoff Assumptions  
Not Met 
Tradeoff Assumptions 
Met 
 
 
Total Not Effective 
& 
Not a Violation 
Not Effective 
& 
Violation 
Effective 
& 
Not a Violation 
Effective 
& 
Violation 
Read Email 
Messages 
5% 52% 19% 24% 100% 
(N=969) 
Phone  
Metadata  
15% 39% 29% 17% 100% 
(N=974) 
Wiretap 
Telephone 
3% 53% 18% 26% 100% 
(N=985) 
National  
ID Card 
27% 27% 41% 6% 100% 
(N=981) 
Pre-Flight  
X-Ray 
7% 6% 73% 15% 100% 
(N=1004) 
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By contrast, those with lower levels of knowledge are less likely to receive any messages in the first place 
and have more difficulty consistently connecting their predispositions to any messages to which they are 
exposed. 
If the elite opinion leadership framework helps explain this public pattern of opinion, we would expect that 
supporters and opponents of President Bush will tend to hold different views regarding whether the domestic 
counterterrorism policies were effective at reducing terrorism and whether these policies violated privacy. 
But we might expect this result based on political predispositions alone. For the data to support that elite 
opinion leadership is at work in structuring individual opinions and not just political predispositions, the 
most knowledgeable Bush supporters should best conform to the administration’s position that these 
domestic counterterrorism policies effectively increase security and do not violate privacy. For Bush 
opponents, higher knowledge levels should have the exact opposite effect on opinions. The most 
knowledgeable Bush disapprovers, relative to the least knowledgeable Bush disapprovers, should view these 
policies as particularly ineffective and a violation of privacy.  
Hypothesis 2: For President Bush approvers, knowledge should positively associate with 
views that these domestic counterterrorism policies effectively increase security and 
negatively associate with views that these policies violate privacy. 
Hypothesis 3: For President Bush disapprovers, knowledge should negatively associate 
with views that these domestic counterterrorism policies effectively increase security 
and positively associate with views that these policies violate privacy. 
The key goal here is to assess whether standard attitude patterns, such as elite opinion leadership, apply to 
the structure of opinion about the privacy and security implications of domestic counterterrorism policies. 
This contrasts with the trade-off framework that assumes people broadly accept that a loss of privacy and 
an increase in security are the inevitable outcomes of domestic counterterrorism policies. 
Two models assess whether the nature of domestic counterterrorism policy opinions (effectiveness and 
privacy) conforms to opinion polarization patterns, which would help explain the Table 1 descriptive results. 
In this context, the elite opinion leadership framework suggests that political predispositions moderate the 
influence of knowledge on attitudes towards the effectiveness and privacy implications of domestic 
counterterrorism policies. The dependent variables are a 0–5 point additive index of the five domestic 
counterterrorism effectiveness questions and a 0–5 point index of the five privacy violation questions used 
in the descriptive analysis. Higher index scores represent agreement that these domestic counterterrorism 
policies are effective at reducing terrorism and a violation of ordinary Americans’ privacy respectively. For 
the theoretically applicable independent variables, we create an interaction term using a standard 
presidential approval question anchored by “strongly approve” and “strongly disapprove” to measure 
political predispositions and an objective knowledge index that gauges individual’s knowledge about 
various aspects of US domestic counterterrorism programs. The following survey script and questions were 
used to construct a four-point knowledge index, with respondents scored as having zero (28% of 
respondents), one (28%), two (29%) or three (15%) correct answers: 
Next we have a few questions about current events. Many people don’t know the answers 
to these questions, so if there are some you don’t know just tell me and we’ll go on. 
Which of the following does the USA Patriot Act primarily deal with, is it...[choices 
rotated randomly] 
 Enhanced surveillance procedures 
 Supplying body armor to the soldiers serving in Iraq 
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 Procedures for interrogating suspected terrorists 
 Security of airlines 
What action did the National Security Agency undertake without first obtaining a 
warrant, was it...[choices rotated randomly] 
 Wiretapping telephone conversations of US citizens 
 Searching immigrants crossing the Mexican border 
 Interrogating terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay 
 Seizing passengers’ luggage at American airports 
What information did the government ask Internet search companies such as Yahoo, 
Google, and Microsoft to turn over about its users, was it...[choices rotated randomly] 
 Internet search terms 
 User’s email addresses  
 Credit card information 
 Computer passwords (Best 2007)  
This interaction term of political predispositions and knowledge will be used to test whether opinion 
polarization regarding the privacy and security implications of domestic counterterrorism policies conforms 
to elite opinion leadership mechanisms. Also included are a series of control variables that have been 
previously shown to shape attitudes towards public policies generally and counterterrorism and surveillance 
policies specifically (Huddy et al. 2005; Stevens and Vaughn-Williams 2014). Demographic variables 
include age, education, income, race, and gender. Attitudinal variables include trust of government, 
ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, patriotism, and partisan identification. Because many of the domestic 
counterterrorism policies involve the use of new information technologies, we also include the degree of 
internet use and a measure of online skills (Ridout, Grosse, and Appleton. 2008). Finally, to capture an 
individual’s personal sensitivity towards privacy violations, we include a measure of past personal privacy 
violations. 
 
 Violation Index Effectiveness Index 
Surveillance Knowledge .337 *** 
(.118) 
-.417 *** 
(.125) 
Bush Approval -.391 *** 
(.094) 
.348 *** 
(.101) 
Knowledge*Approval -.195 *** 
(.052) 
.163 *** 
(.056) 
Age -.002 
(.004) 
-.003  
(.004) 
Income -.098 * 
(.051) 
.028 
(.056) 
White -.205 .147 
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(.144) (.148) 
Education .033 
(.062) 
-.030 
(.066) 
Female .232 * 
(.129) 
-.276 ** 
(.138) 
Government Trust -.320 *** 
(.085) 
.229 *** 
(.087) 
Authoritarianism -.201 *** 
(.065) 
.267 *** 
(.070) 
Personal Privacy Violation .188 ** 
(.069) 
-.024 
(.070) 
Online Skills .146 * 
(.078) 
.025 
(.081) 
Internet Usage -.087 
(.052) 
.011 
(.054) 
Party Identification -.015 
(.037) 
.028 
(.039) 
Patriotism -.120  
(.078) 
.253 *** 
(.080) 
Ethnocentrism -.221 *** 
(.062) 
.306 *** 
(.064) 
LR Chi-SQR 310.5 279.8 
N 965 878 
Cells are coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.  
*p <.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table 2: Ordered Logistic Models of Effectiveness and Violation Indices 
 
Table 2 displays the two ordered logistic regression models of the privacy violation index and the 
effectiveness index.5 In each model, the interaction term is statistically significant at conventional thresholds 
(p < .01), suggesting that the effect of knowledge on attitudes is indeed different for Bush approvers and 
disapprovers. Of course, the interaction terms of presidential approval and surveillance knowledge make 
straightforward interpretation of the coefficients challenging from the numerical tables alone. Therefore, to 
gauge how knowledge levels differently influences Bush supporters’ and opponents’ views of privacy and 
effectiveness, we graphically display the effect using the Clarify addition to Stata Statistical Software (King, 
Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). This approach displays the effect of surveillance knowledge on the 
effectiveness and the violation indices, as moderated by presidential approval. Specifically, Figures 3 and 4 
display high and low knowledge Bush approvers’ and high and low knowledge Bush disapprovers’ predicted 
probabilities of having high scores on the violation and effectiveness indices. 
 
                                                   
5 Because the dependent variable is not continuous, ordered logistic regression, rather than OLS, is used. 
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Figure 1: Effect of knowledge on effectiveness views by presidential approval. 
 
Figure 2: Effect of knowledge on violation views by presidential approval. 
The results support hypotheses two and three: knowledge has opposite effects for Bush approvers and Bush 
disapprovers. As such, the results are consistent with standard opinion polarization frameworks and suggest 
that elite opinion leadership drives individual opinion. The figures show that knowledgeable Bush 
supporters, relative to less knowledgeable Bush supporters, consider these policies less likely to violate 
privacy and more likely to effectively reduce terrorism. Sophisticated supporters are most aligned with the 
administration’s positions about the privacy and efficacy of these surveillance programs. As expected, 
higher knowledge levels have the opposite effect on those who disapprove of the president. Knowledgeable 
Bush disapprovers, compared to less knowledgeable Bush disapprovers, consider these policies more likely 
to violate privacy and less likely to reduce terrorism. Well-informed opponents of the president are least 
aligned with the administration’s messages.  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Bush Supporters Bush Opposers
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0
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Additionally, Bush approvers and disapprovers with the lowest degree of surveillance knowledge have more 
similar attitudes towards the privacy implications and counterterror effectiveness of these policies compared 
to Bush approvers and disapprovers with the highest degree of surveillance knowledge. The magnitude of 
the privacy and effectiveness opinion gaps is substantively impressive. Comparing Bush supporters’ and 
opponents’ probability of scoring high on the effectiveness opinion index, we see just a 23-point 
effectiveness opinion gap for the least knowledgeable respondents; this gap swells to 53 points for the most 
knowledgeable respondents. We see a very similar pattern when considering Bush supporters’ versus Bush 
opponents’ attitudes towards privacy violations, with the opinions much more similar for those with low 
knowledge levels (20-point gap) compared to those with high levels of knowledge (42-point gap). These 
results suggest that the opinion polarization at the individual level seems to be driven as much by political 
predispositions as by elite opinion leadership.  
Discussion and Extension of Findings 
Studies of attitudes towards surveillance and privacy should attempt to assess their practical relevance 
because the surveillance and privacy literature often finds that individual preferences for valuing privacy 
fail to translate into actions protecting privacy (Joinson et al. 2010) or into support for policies ensuring 
privacy or curtailing surveillance efforts (Ajzen 1991). This disconnect between individual privacy values 
and logically anticipated individual outcomes is described as “the privacy paradox” (Simon 1955, 1982). 
Numerous examples of this paradox have been demonstrated. For example, despite expressing support for 
the value of privacy and concerns surrounding privacy violations, individuals still submit personal 
information online or on non-anonymous surveys in contravention to explicitly identified values (Smith, 
Diney, and Xu 2011; Degli Espositi, Payone, and Santiago-Gomez 2017) often in order to secure a small 
benefit (Barth and de Jong 2017). Privacy concerns are triggered, it seems, only when the violations are 
personally very consequential (van der Brock et al. 2017), suggesting that generalized concern about privacy 
violations are not inherently motivating (Barth and de Jong 2017). Most relevant for this project, the 
relationship between privacy and government intrusion in particular is constantly re-negotiated through 
fiscal, employment, educational, and other channels, potentially fracturing the connection between general 
attitudes and acceptance of government actions (Smith, Diney, and Xu 2011).6  
The privacy paradox literature suggests that we should not simply assume that the attitudinal components 
of the supposed trade-off studied in this project will have meaningful impact on more practical outcomes, 
such as support for or opposition to domestic counterterrorism policies. Therefore, we offer a test of the 
components’ relevance for understanding the structure of opinion towards domestic counterterrorism 
policies. As we will describe below, some attitudes towards the components of the supposed trade-off should 
logically disrupt the positive connection between terrorist threat and support for domestic counterterrorism 
polices.  
A review of securitization theory suggests that governments often inflate crises to shape desired policy 
outcomes, including the expansion of the surveillance state. The identification of some existential threat is 
used to promote the acceptance of security maximizing policies (Hundt 2014; Schneier 2003, 2008) and 
expand government power into new spheres (Fuchs 2013; Buzan, Waever, and deWilde 1998; Huijboom 
and Bodea 2015; Strauβ 2017). Mueller’s 2009 book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism 
Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, offers a substantive examination of 
this phenomenon in the United States. Mueller argues that the US executive branch purposely amplifies 
terrorism threat levels to bolster support for internationally aggressive and domestically invasive 
                                                   
6 Merchelli (2017) considers the paradox of support for inefficacious government-run airport security screenings. 
Despite limited demonstrated efficacy and increased cost in terms of time and personal invasion, individuals 
supported heightened security airport screening because heightened screening meant the government was trying to 
do something rather than nothing to keep them safe from terrorism. 
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antiterrorism policies (see also Huddy et al. 2005).7 US elites pushing the threat of terrorism seems to be an 
effective strategy, as citizens respond by increasing support for domestically invasive counterterror policies. 
This connection has been consistently shown in empirical studies, with higher individual perceptions of 
terrorist threat powerfully associating with higher levels of policy support (Davis and Silver 2004; 
Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Huddy et al. 2005, 2007; Cohrs et al. 2005; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; 
Kam and Kinder 2007; Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2007; Haider-Markel, Joslyn, and Tal-Baghal2006; Norris 
2017; Best, Krueger, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012; Stevens and Vaughn-Williams 2014; Dolan and Ilderton 
2017).  
We reason that the connection between terrorism threat and counterterrorism policy support should be 
disrupted by the attitudes focused on in this project. Our logic borrows from Garcia and Geva’s work (2016); 
increased terrorism threat should not increase support for invasive counterterrorism policies when people 
think these policies fail to protect people from terrorism.8 The Table 1 results show that large proportions 
of Americans, often a majority, do not see these domestic surveillance programs as effective at preventing 
terrorism. For this reason, we should detect a major attenuation of the positive relationship between 
terrorism threat and support for domestic counterterrorism policies among individuals who find these 
policies ineffective at reducing terrorism. In our view, the axiomatic positive relationship between 
perceptions of terrorism threat and support for domestic counterterrorism policies should extend only to 
those who believe domestic surveillance programs work to reduce terrorism. While this may seem obvious, 
it is worth testing for two reasons. First, most empirical models of the relationship between terrorism threat 
and counterterrorism policy support reviewed above do not make this distinction but instead treat the terror 
threat effect as uniform across individuals. Second, consistent with the privacy paradox, attitudes towards 
surveillance often fail to translate into expected outcomes, which makes judgments about the implications 
of surveillance attitudes using logic alone undependable.  
Therefore, we develop a test to assess whether attitudes towards the effectiveness of domestic 
counterterrorism programs can disrupt the connection between terrorism threat and support for domestic 
counterterrorism policies. For the dependent variable, respondents were asked how strongly they support or 
oppose each of the five domestic counterterrorism policies. Because each policy has five response 
categories, factor analysis is used to create a factor score representing overall levels of policy support or 
opposition. We included the same independent variable specification as the previous models. Further, to test 
the key conditional effect, we include a standard measure of perceived terrorism threat and the previously 
detailed effectiveness and privacy violation indices. Specifically, we create an interaction term of the 
effectiveness index and the perceived terrorism threat measure to determine if the effect of terrorism threat 
is moderated by individuals’ views towards effectiveness.  
Hypothesis 4: The association between perceptions of terrorism threat and support for 
counterterrorism policies will be null when individuals generally believe that domestic 
counterterrorism policies do not effectively reduce terrorism. 
The first column of Table 3 shows a nested model to establish that the relationship between threat and policy 
support conforms with the literature; the results replicate the common finding that perceived terrorism threat 
predicts support for domestic counterterrorism policies. The second model includes the interaction term, 
which is used to assess whether the effect of perceived terrorism threat is attenuated for those who believe 
these policies ineffective at reducing terrorism. The interaction term of perceived terrorism threat and the 
                                                   
7 The US executive branch creates national-level (sociotropic) perceptions of threat rather than personal safety 
concerns, as sociotropic threats are more significant than individual threats in shaping counterterrorism policy 
attitudes (Joslyn and Haides-Markel 2007). This aligns well with psychology literature on threat that shows 
individuals under threat react by seeking to resolve the basis of the threat (Witte 1992; Witte and Allen 2000). 
8 Garcia and Geva’s (2016) experiment builds in the liberty-security trade-off assumption challenged by this project. 
Work such as Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir (2015) offers related insights showing chronic terrorist acts have 
different effects on intolerance attitudes depending on political affiliation of the individual. 
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effectiveness index is statistically significant at conventional levels (p<.01). Figure 3 shows the effect of 
this interaction term by displaying the marginal effect of perceived terrorism threat on support for domestic 
counterterror policies across the different levels of the effectiveness index. Because hypothesis four 
anticipates insignificant results, we use the 90% confidence level as the threshold to give the conventional 
finding of a significant positive relationship the greatest opportunity to receive support.  
 Support Domestic  
Counterterrorism Policies 
Support Domestic 
Counterterrorism Policies 
Threat*Effectiveness - .036 *** 
(.011) 
Terrorism Threat .056 *** 
(.019) 
-.043 
(.035) 
Effectiveness Index .212 *** 
(.014) 
.108 *** 
(.034) 
Violation Index -.245 *** 
(.016) 
-.245 *** 
(.016) 
Surveillance Knowledge -.026 
(.039) 
-.023 
(.039) 
Bush Approval .062 * 
(.031) 
.071 ** 
(.031) 
Knowledge*Approval .014 
(.017) 
.012 
(.017) 
Age .002 
(.001) 
.002 
(.001) 
Income .018 
(.017) 
.015 
(.017) 
White .015 
(.045) 
.005 
(.045) 
Education -.001 
(.020) 
-.001 
(.020) 
Female .054  
(.042) 
.049 
(.042) 
Government Trust -.033 
(.027) 
-.032 
(.027) 
Authoritarianism .027 
(.021) 
.026 
(.021) 
Personal Privacy Violation .025 
(.021) 
.019 
(.022) 
Online Skills .029 
(.025) 
.021 
(.025) 
Internet Usage -.025 
(.017) 
-.017 
(.017) 
Party Identification .018 
(.012) 
.016 
(.012) 
Patriotism -.020 
(.025) 
-.014 
(.025) 
Ethnocentrism .048 ** 
(.020) 
.048 ** 
(.020) 
R2 0.67 0.67 
F 80.69 78.22 
N 780 780 
Cells are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.  
*p <.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Table 3: OLS Model Predicting Support for Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies. 
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Figure 3: Terror threat effect on support for domestic counterterrorism policy by effectiveness level. 
We find that for those respondents with low scores (0, 1, or 2) on the effectiveness index, terrorism threat 
has no significant association with domestic counterterrorism policy support, even when using the liberal 
90% confidence level. This null condition comprises about half of the sample (scores of 0, 1, or 2 on the 
effectiveness index). Only those that had scores of 3, 4, or 5 on the effectiveness index, also representing 
about 50% of the sample, had positive statistically significant associations between terrorism threat and 
support for domestic counterterror policies. This pattern supports hypothesis four; terror threat would only 
associate with support for counterterrorism policies when there was some reasonable prospect of that policy 
resolving the threat. This threshold is identified as believing that a majority of the domestic counterterrorism 
policies would effectively reduce terrorism. The overall positive effect of perceived terrorism threat in 
column one of Table 3 then is driven by just the half of respondents that consider these policies to be 
generally effective tools to reduce terrorism in the United States. It seems that the attitudinal components 
(i.e., effectiveness index) of the supposed trade-off indeed have relevance for understanding the structure of 
domestic counterterrorism policy support and are not simply interesting antecedent attitudes with little 
practical import as is sometimes found in studies of privacy and surveillance. 
Conclusion 
Public opinion scholarship commonly assumes that counterterrorism policy preferences are structured by 
the security-liberty trade-off framework with policy attitudes formed by advantaging one value at the 
expense of the other. Several European studies have offered strong evidence that ordinary individuals do 
not typically think in terms of a trade-off when considering counterterrorism policies (van der Brock 2017; 
Potoglou et al. 2010; Bellanova and Gonzalez-Fuster 2013). Despite this work probing the veracity of the 
trade-off framework for understanding European attitudes, we still lack an overt examination about whether 
US attitudes conform to this trade-off framework. A focus on the trade-off thinking in the US is warranted 
because privacy and surveillance attitudes can vary greatly by culture and context and because the United 
States’ approach to security often trickles over into the security arrangements of US allies. 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 Effective 1 Effective 2 Effective 3 Effective 4 Effective 5 Effective
Mean Terrorism Threat Effect with 90% Confidence Interval
 S
up
po
rt
 fo
r D
om
es
tic
 C
ou
nt
er
te
rr
or
ism
 P
ol
ic
y  
Krueger, Best, and Johnson: Assessing Dimensions 
Surveillance & Society 18(1) 118 
In this study, a nationally representative survey of US residents demonstrates that the vast majority of 
Americans do not think of domestic counterterrorism policies in terms consistent with the assumptions of 
the liberty-security values trade-off. Specifically, the vast majority of US residents do not believe that these 
counterterrorism policies are simultaneously effective at reducing terrorism and a violation of privacy. 
Instead of fitting the trade-off assumptions that these policies increase security and impair privacy, what we 
find is that perceptions about the security and privacy implications of these policies generally sort into large 
contrasting camps. Respondents typically thought these policies either do not effectively reduce terrorism 
but do violate privacy or do effectively reduce terrorism and do not violate privacy. Rather than needing to 
carefully weigh privacy versus security, most US residents simply dismiss the applicability of one side of 
the liberty-security trade-off. Little evidence exists to support that trade-off thinking broadly occurs in the 
US population. 
This opinion polarization pattern suggests that elite opinion leadership may be at work. When tested, we 
found that the data conforms to the standard elite opinion leadership framework, which helps comprehend 
why most people are sorted into distinct camps. Even above and beyond their political predispositions, 
individuals most aware of current events tend to most conform to the domestic counterterrorism attitudes of 
elites with whom they typically agree. Therefore, to protect democratic affirming attitudes in the face of 
terrorism we need to insist on maintaining vigorous public debate during times of crisis, especially from 
widely visible opposition leaders. Unfortunately, in the United States, opposition leaders are often silent 
and deferential to the executive branch during the critical moments that decide the trajectory of domestic 
counterterrorism policies, such as congressional Democrats’ near universal early support for the initial 
Patriot Act.  
Our results also have important consequences for understanding the regularly found positive relationship 
between the degree of terrorism threat and support for domestic counterterrorism policies. Instead of threat 
leading to a visceral, universal effect on support for counterterrorism policies, our results strongly suggest 
that perceived terrorist threat positively relates to support for domestic counterterrorism policies for only 
the subset of the US population that thinks these policies work to reduce terrorism. Large subpopulations of 
US residents think these domestic surveillance policies do not work as intended to reduce terrorism. As 
such, studies that follow the practice of simply including a linear terrorism threat variable in their models 
of policy support risk presenting a deeply inaccurate account of how threat connects to support for state 
domestic surveillance programs. 
Of course, the primary concern of this project centers on testing whether the security-liberty trade-off 
framework actually structures the attitudes of US residents. If people are not thinking this way, then it is 
problematic to persist in using this framework given that the framework confines the range of policy 
discussions to discovering how much privacy the public should cede in order to prevent terrorism. Because 
dramatic loss of life via a terrorist attack generally will trump broadly dispersed privacy violations, debating 
within the trade-off framework when terrorist threat is high advantages the security side of the debate. At 
the same time, the assumptions of this framework that these policies work to keep us safe but regrettably 
violate privacy avoids the critical debate about the efficacy of these terrorism prevention measures. The 
basic question, “do these policies work?” is sidelined within the trade-off framework because this 
characteristic is taken a given. But research shows that these security policies may not work or, worse, may 
encourage future acts. As Dragu (2017) argues, democratic regimes restricting free speech and civil liberties 
in response to terrorism may actually increase the likelihood of subsequent attacks, while maintaining 
democratic norms and principles can decrease the probability of an attack. The United States may need to 
work harder to engage in an easily accessible, transparent, public dialogue about the efficacy of domestic 
prevention policies. More than anything else, our results suggest that the foundation of the security-liberty 
frame should be more carefully questioned by US policy makers, scholars, and the public alike. And our 
results suggest that one of the best ways for scholars to approach this may be by evaluating the security 
implications of these policies, not simply their privacy informing characteristics. 
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